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Abstract
We propose a mechanism for solving the airport slot allocation problem in Europe. We consider the
interdependence of the slots at di®erent airports, and we maximize the e±ciency of the system. Through
an experimental analysis we quantitatively assess the cost imposed by grandfather rights, which constitute
one of the main principles of the current slot allocation mechanism. Moreover, we introduce the possibility
to fairly redistribute costs among airlines through monetary compensations. Our results suggest that it is
possible to remove grandfather rights without signi¯cantly penalizing airlines.
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1 Introduction
The current European Air Tra±c Management (ATM) system is not expected to be able to cope e±ciently
with the predicted growth of air tra±c in Europe in the next ten to twenty years. In response of this challenge,
in 2004 the European Commission launched the Single European Sky initiative whose technological dimension
for promoting innovation in ATM is SESAR, the Single European Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR
Consortium 2008). A key concept in SESAR is the introduction of Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) tools
for making the most of available resources (SESAR Consortium 2007).
An important area of implementation of possible ad-hoc CDM mechanisms is the strategic agreement dur-
ing the °ight planning phase to adjust tra±c demand or individual °ight trajectories if airports cannot provide
su±cient capacity. In fact, the lack of airport capacity is a major constraint for the development of air tra±c be-
cause the building of new runways is strongly limited. Then there is the need to design procedures which exploit
as much as possible the available airport scarce resources. Formal procedures are implemented for allocating
capacity and coordinate schedules. In Europe, these procedures comply with International Air Transport Asso-
ciation (IATA) and European Commission regulations (International Air Transport Association 2010, Council
1of the European Community 1993, 2004). In this framework, about six months before the starting of either
the summer (April to October) or winter (November to March) season, representatives of airlines and airports
meet at a IATA conference to allocate airport slots for the forthcoming season. A slot is a scheduled time of
arrival or departure available for allocation for an aircraft movement on a speci¯c date and airport. Currently,
this slot allocation problem is solved in two steps. Initially, grandfather (or historical) rights are identi¯ed. An
airline has a right to a slot if it has made use of the correspondent slot in the preceding equivalent season. Such
right can be lost only as a consequence of the use-it-or-loose-it rule: a slot can be allocated to another airline
if its usage on the preceding equivalent season has been lower than 80%. Then, the free slots are all grouped in
a pool. Half of this pool is allocated to new entrants (new entrant rule). For being such, an airline requesting
a series of slots at an airport on a day must have less than ¯ve slots at that airport at that day, if its request is
accepted. The remaining slots are ¯nally allocated in a non-discriminatory manner.
The ¯rst drawback of the above slot allocation mechanism is represented by the loss of economic e±ciency
due to the existence of grandfather rights: the use-it-or-loose-it rule has the e®ect of eventually inducing airlines
to use slots ine±ciently for not loosing them. Moreover, historical rights represent a strong entrance barrier for
potential competitors notwithstanding the new entrant rule (DotEcon Ltd 2001, Maldoom 2003, Starkie 1998).
Thus the current mechanism favors immobility in the market and prevents competition among airlines. As a
result, scarce resources are often not used as e±ciently as possible.
The ATM community emphasizes the need of a major modi¯cation of the current mechanism for overcoming
these drawbacks. A new mechanism should allocate slots to whom values them the most. The need for this
type of study is pointed out in a wide number of reports commissioned by the European Commission and
other national institutions (DotEcon Ltd 2001, 2006, NERA Economic Consulting 2004). Also in the scienti¯c
literature several, authors investigate the opportunity of implementing auction mechanisms for managing slots,
following the current practice at some US airports (Fukui 2010, Kleit & Kobayashi 1996, Maldoom 2003,
Sentance 2003, Starkie 1998, Verhoef 2010). On the side of this rich branch of research, Madas & Zografos
(2006) make an interesting qualitative analysis of the main strategies that may be implemented. In particular,
the authors point out ¯ve type of strategies, characterized by an increasing level of di®erentiation with respect
to the current slot allocation mechanism. The extreme scenarios correspond, on the one hand, to combining
grandfather rights and the rationale of administrative coordination of slot allocation, and, on the other hand, to
abandoning grandfather rights entirely and basing the allocation on decentralized auctions. The intermediate
steps are characterized by di®erent combination of grandfather rights, central coordination and free market.
In this paper, we quantitatively analyze the economic impact of grandfather rights by comparing airlines'
costs when these rights are either enforced or not. We consider the cost due to the non-optimality of the ¯nal
schedule allotted to each airline for respecting capacity constraints. We propose a slot allocation mechanism
based on an integer programming model and we perform experimental tests on realistic instances that simulate
air tra±c demand over a portion of the European sky in a 5 hour time horizon. We show that the system
disutility (i.e., the sum of the costs of the individual airlines) is higher when grandfather rights are present.
Then we introduce some compensation mechanisms in the slot allocation process for fairly transferring the
disutility of the system to each airline. The results of our experimental simulations show that compensations
may help in redistributing among airlines the surplus deriving from the elimination of grandfather rights. In
this way, it is possible to implement a mechanism in which social utility increases, without inevitably damaging
the airlines that loose their grandfather rights.
In the current slot allocation mechanism airports are considered independent one of the other. It is not taken
into account that, for each °ight, an airline needs a feasible combination of slots at the origin and destination
airports (NERA Economic Consulting 2004). Thus, an a-posteriori adjustments to the initial allocation may be
necessary. Our slot allocation mechanism overcomes this weakness by simultaneously allocating slots at several
airports and considering the structure of the network and the airlines requests in terms of origin-destination
pairs. Thus, it provides a slot allocation that is coherent with the desired schedule from the very beginning.
To the best of our knowledge, the interdependence among slots at di®erent airports is formally considered only
in Rassenti et al. (1982). The authors proposed a combinatorial auction mechanism for airport slot allocation.
Still, the main focus was on the e±ciency and robustness of the auction design in terms of demand revelation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our slot allocation mechanism and details
the integer programming model. In Section 3 we propose three compensation mechanisms that can be included
in the model. In Section 4 we depict the structure of the experimental analysis and we report the results.
2Finally, in Section 5 we draw some conclusions and de¯ne some future development of this research.
2 Slot Allocation Models
Our mechanism solves the slot allocation problem at all airports simultaneously, while considering the structure
of the air route network. In this way, an airline obtains for each °ight a departure (arrival) slot if at the
destination (origin) airport it receives a slot which is compatible with the °ight duration of one of the possible
routes connecting the two airports. Moreover, we assume that, due to commercial and operations reasons, an
airline has an ideal pair of departure and arrival slots, hereafter referred to simply as ideal slots, for each of
its °ights. When this ideal pair is not available, the airline has to anticipate or delay the departure and the
corresponding arrival time and this shift induces an undesired cost, hereafter referred to as shift cost.
We model the problem of allocating airport slots to airlines while taking into account the air route network
as a mathematical programming problem. In doing this, we rely on mathematical formulations which till now
have been used in the Air Tra±c Flow Management (ATFM) problem (Bertsimas et al. 2008, 2009, Bertsimas
& Patterson 1998, 2000, Lulli & Odoni 2007, Sherali & Hill 2009).
ATFM models are used to prevent short-term demand-capacity imbalances by adjusting the °ows of aircrafts
combining actions such as the imposition of rerouting, ground holding, airborne holding and aircraft speed
control. The most recent papers (such as Bertsimas et al. 2009) optimize the tra±c °ow on a short-term basis,
i.e., a few hours before °ight departures, taking into account the capacity of all elements (airports and en route
sectors) of the ATM system. They consider details, such as whether conditions, that are not available in the
planning phase, when the airport slot allocation is performed.
Our slot allocation model is a variant of the Bertsimas et al. (2009) one. Our formulation relies on a simpli¯ed
representation of the route network, e.g., we assume that the time required to cross every sector is ¯xed (no
speed control) and that the en-route sectors are uncapacitated. On the other hand, di®erently from the reference
model, we consider airlines managing multiple °ights and grandfather rights. In addition, the Bertsimas et al.
(2009) model assumes that the schedule of each °ight is already known. Any action to react to unforseen events
necessarily leads to the introduction of either ground holding or airborne delay departure, when °ight rerouting
is not su±cient. On the contrary, our model, in trying to accommodate all the demand into the available slots,
assumes that in the planning phase there is still room to both anticipating and delaying the departure and
arrival times with respect to the ideal slots. As a consequence, we seek a solution that minimizes the shift
costs while Bertsimas et al. (2009) minimize the delay costs. In this framework, our model allows each airline
to indicate the maximum shift it can bear for each °ight. To this aim some sharing of information is needed.
For coping with the reluctance of airlines of making their costs and requirements transparent to competitors,
in accordance with Soomer & Franks (2008), our mechanism is regulated by an independent coordinator that
is in charge of managing sensible data.
2.1 The mathematical formulation
Notation
The model's formulation requires de¯nition of the following notation:
A ´ set of airlines,
F ´ set of °ights,
Fa µ F ´ set of °ights of airline a,
K ´ set of airports,
S ´ set of (en-route) sectors,
Sf µ S [ K ´ set of sectors that can be °own by °ight f, including the origin and the desti-
nation airports,
3T ´ set of time periods,
P
f
i ´ set of sector i's preceding sectors (i 2 Sf),
L
f
i ´ set of sector i's subsequent sectors (i 2 Sf),
Kj;t ´ capacity of airport j at time t,
Ga
j;t ´ number of slots on which airline a has grandfather right at airport j at time t
df ´ ideal departure slot of °ight f,
af ´ ideal arrival slot of °ight f,
origf ´ origin airport of °ight f,
destf ´ destination airport of °ight f,
lfjj0 ´ number of time units that °ight f must spend in sector j before entering in
sector j0,














destf] ´ accepted arrival slots for °ight f,
cf(^ t) ´ cost of deviating of ^ t time intervals from the ideal arrival slot of °ight f,
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be the cost imposed to °ight f. Note that the ¯rst part of the cost depends on the arrival time, while the second
part depends on the °ight duration, and hence, implicitly on the departure time. If no shift is assigned to the
ideal arrival slot or to the ideal duration, this cost is null. Otherwise it is given by a function of such shift.
Costs for executing °ights are considered independent from the exact schedule. Thus, costs due to a shift of
departure and arrival slots correspond to revenue losses. If we consider a utility function that is directly (and
linearly) proportional to revenue, minimizing costs, and thus revenue losses, is equivalent to maximizing utility.
In particular, in this paper we consider cf(^ t) = ®^ t¯; c
f
dur(^ d) = ° ^ d8f 2 F; being ®; ¯ and ° nonnegative
parameters.





that represents the sum of the cost imposed to all °ights.
4The Constraints



























j;t¡1 · Kj;t ¡ Ga















































j;t · 0 8f 2 F; j 2 Sf; t 2 T (13)
w
f
j;t 2 f0;1g 8f 2 F; j 2 Sf; t 2 T (14)
Constraints (4) and (5) ensure that all °ights are executed in the time interval that is declared to be accept-
able by the airline. Constraints (6) ensure that airport capacity is not exceeded at any time, and constraints
(7) that grandfather rights are respected. Constraints (8) and (9), and (10), (11) and (13) represent routes'
time and spatial coherence, respectively. As an example, constraints (9) ensure that an aircraft cannot enter a
sector unless it has crossed a preceding one. According to constraints (12), each °ight cannot last more than its
maximum duration declared. Finally, constraints (14) impose the use of binary variables. Let us remark that
constraints (7) and (8), are not present in the reference model (Bertsimas et al. 2009).
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i;t¡lfij 8f 2 F; j 2 Sf n forigfg;t 2 T (18)
Equations (17), (15) and (16) are presented by Bertsimas et al. (2009). Equation (18) is added following
the introduction of constraints (8).
The e±ciency in slot allocation can be increased by removing the restrictions enforcing the existence of
grandfather rights (constraints (7)). The two models, where constraints (7) are either imposed or not, will be
5tested in Section 4, and they will be referred to as the grandfather rights model (GFR) and free allocation model
(FA), respectively.
3 Compensation Mechanisms
In principle, GFR and FA may penalize just a few airlines to the bene¯t of the whole system. In fact, it
may happen that all °ights whose slots are shifted belong only to a subset of airlines. In this Section we
propose further constraints to add to GFR and FA that increase the fairness of the ¯nal solution through a
monetary compensation mechanism. Let pa be an additional decision variable representing the amount of money
received/payed by an airline a 2 A. If pa is greater than 0 then it is the compensation for the cost the airline
must bear when its °ights are shifted. If pa is less than 0 it is the amount payed by the airline for compensating
competitors subject to a high shift cost. In order to be e®ectively implemented the mechanism has to meet two
properties: budget balance and individual rationality (?).
A mechanism is budget balanced if the overall amount paid and received by the airlines participating in it
sums up to 0:
X
a2A
pa = 0: (19)
In such a way the independent coordinator neither subsidizes the market nor gains from it.
A mechanism is individual rational if it does not cause a decrement of the utility of any airline without
compensating it by an appropriate side payment. In other words, each airline must have no disadvantage in
participating to the mechanism. The amount payed as compensation plus the shift cost must be at most equal
to the maximum cost the airline is ready to bear:
X
f2Fa













origf ¡ (af ¡ df))g 8a 2 A: (20)
As previously mentioned, the airline itself declares this value when it announces the cost associated to the
maximum acceptable variation with respect to the requested schedule.
Several combinations of payments can satisfy constraints (19) and (20). For example, a solution in which
pa = 0, for all a 2 A is feasible, although not achieving the desired fairness. Moreover, due to constraint (19)













For achieving a fair allocation, we may add to GFR and FA a further set of constraints ensuring that each
airline bears no more than a share sa of the total cost (22):
X
f2Fa
Cf ¡ pa · sa
X
f2F
Cf 8a 2 A; (22)
where 0 · sa · 1 and
P
a sa = 1.
6Several methods for computing these shares are possible. One choice is to penalize airlines proportionally
to their contribution to the infeasibility of the ideal solution. In particular, let ^ KT be the set of combination
airport-time in which slot demand is greater than capacity:
^ KT = f(j;t);j 2 K;t 2 T :
X
f2F
I(j;t;f) > Kjtg; (23)
where I(j;t;f) is equal to 1 if the ideal slot either at arrival or at departure of °ight f is at airport j at time t,
and 0 otherwise. Then
sa =
jFa : (origf;df) 2 ^ KT _ (destf;af) 2 ^ KTj
P
(j;t)2 ^ KT Kj;t
8a 2 A: (24)
In this way, if an airline a asks only for slots in periods with no excess demand (and hence sa = 0) and it
must bear a time shift for allowing a feasible schedule (
P
f2Fa Cf > 0), the consequent cost must be completely
compensated. If, instead, an airline requires to land at a main airport in the peak time (and hence sa > 0) then
even if it is allowed to do so, it must be ready to refund competitors that do not have the same opportunity. In
the following we will refer to this method as contribution to infeasibility (CI).
Two other possibilities consist in considering an equal distribution of costs to °ights or to airlines. In the
¯rst case (equal °ights, EF), each airline bears a share of the total cost that is equal to the ratio between the
number of °ights it requests and the total number of °ights in the system. In the second case (equal airlines,
EA), the total cost is just equally divided among airlines. These two methods can be enforced by computing








8a 2 A: (26)
4 Computational Experience
In this Section, we analyze the di®erent possibilities for enhancing the e±ciency and the fairness of the slot
allocation mechanism. In particular we compare GFR with the models that either eliminate simply the grand-
father rights (FA), or also introduce one of the compensation mechanisms, i.e., FA+CI, or FA+EF, or FA+EA.
The di®erence in the results are tested for statistical signi¯cance at the 95% con¯dence level, according to the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
We run the experimental analysis on 100 randomly generated instances in which we simulate 5 hours tra±c
over a portion of the European sky. We consider 2200 °ights of 20 airlines on a network of 60 airports, 4
of which hubs, and 300 sectors. The time horizon is divided in 20 ¯fteen-minute time intervals. Each °ight
spends one time interval in each sector it crosses, and it cannot exceed a 2-hour duration. Airport capacity
is set to 28 for each time interval. Thus we have a set of 560 slots per airport. This value is consistent with
Eurocontrol Experimental Centre (2009) considering the four larger European hubs. The same value is used for
local airports, for representing the typical situation in which no capacity restrictions are imposed. At each hub,
mimicking the situation at highly congested airports, as for example London Heathrow, 90% of slots are subject















































Incumbent New Incumbent New
(b) Cost per set of airlines
Figure 1: Total shift cost implied by the grandfather rights and free allocation models.
which do not have grandfather rights, and 15 incumbent airlines, which enjoy grandfather rights. The new
airlines own in average about 37 °ights, i.e., 1:69% of the °ights considered. The incumbent airlines have their
grandfather rights at the hubs assigned by randomly selecting some of their °ights. Sectors are represented as a
grid of square cells, and the location of airports is randomly distributed, imposing a minimum distance of three
cells between each pair of airports. The maximum shift allowed is set equal to 2 time intervals for each °ight,
i.e., half an hour. The origin and the destination of each °ight are randomly chosen, at least one of them being
a hub. The ideal departure slot is randomly drawn and the arrival one is computed consequently, considering
the shortest feasible route. Then, a check is done for seeking feasibility: both for origin and destination airports
of each °ight f, we check if, considering the ideal slots of all °ights, total demand is lower than total capacity
at that airport, within the maximum shift accepted for f. If this is not the case, then setting that slot as ideal
one for °ight f will turn into an infeasible instance. Thus, a new random selection is made. This procedure
mimics the current practice, in which, if requests cannot be satis¯ed, the schedule coordinator asks airlines to
change their requirements (International Air Transport Association 2010).
We set the parameters of the cost coe±cients in the objective function equal for all °ights: ® = 10;¯ =
1:5;° = 10. By setting ¯ greater than 1, shifting the arrival slot of 2 °ights of ^ t is less costly than shifting the
arrival slot of one °ight of 2^ t.
We solved these 100 instances with an optimality gap of 1%, using XPRESS optimizer version 20.00.11 on
a Intel Core 2 Duo CPU at 1.86 GHz and with 2.00Gb of Ram. The CPU time necessary for computing the
matrix and solving instances was, in average, 180.25 seconds, ranging between 35.06 and 1681.58 seconds.
4.1 Grandfather rights vs. free allocation
Figure 1 reports the results achieved by GFR and FA. The grey horizontal lines represent the median of the
solution cost of GFR. Figure 1(a) shows the total cost computed over all airlines: the total cost implied by FA
is on average 7:08% lower than that implied by GFR. The di®erence in favor of FA is statistically signi¯cant.
Figure 1(b) distinguishes the cost born by incumbent airlines, which in GFR hold grandfather rights, and by
new ones. The cost increase su®ered by the former group when comparing GFR and FA is much lower than the
cost reduction enjoyed by the latter. On the one hand, new airlines are better o® in FA in 98 instances over
100; the average improvement is 93:55%, and in the two unfavorable case the cost increase is 0:82% and 5:52%,
respectively. The di®erence is statistically signi¯cant in favor of FA. On the other hand, the costs for incumbent
airlines in average increase of 2:36%, with a maximum of 11:37%. The di®erence is statistically signi¯cant in
favor of GFR. In 28 instances even incumbent airlines would gain from the removal of grandfather rights. This
situation occurs, as they want to introduce °ights for which they do not have grandfather rights.
4.2 Grandfather rights vs. free allocation with compensation
The results of the the three compensation models described in Section 3 are introduced here. In particular we
present the value of the disutility of the two groups of airlines. We compare these values with the values obtained
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(c) Equal airlines
Figure 2: Total shift cost of the grandfather rights model and the free allocation one with compensation.
Table 1: Percentage cost decrease with the free allocation model with and without compensation with respect
to GFR. A star indicates if the di®erence is statistically signi¯cant at the 95% con¯dence level, according to
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
FA FA+CI FA+EF FA+EA
incumbent airlines ¡2:36¤ ¡0:48 ¡10:88¤ 15:97¤
new airlines 93:55¤ 60:47¤ 1122:30¤ ¡19:69¤
represent the median of the solution cost of GFR. When the free allocation with the contribution to infeasibility
compensation (FA+CI) is implemented (Figure 2(a)), new airlines have a signi¯cant advantage with respect to
GFR. Incumbent airlines, instead, are almost indi®erent. If the equal °ights compensation model (FA+EF)
is considered, new airlines obtain a signi¯cant relative cost decrease. Incumbent airlines, instead, su®er from
a signi¯cant cost increase. When the equal airlines compensation model (FA+EA) is used (Figure 2(c)), new
airlines are strongly penalized, while incumbent ones enjoy a cost decrease. The percentage cost decrease in the
di®erent scenarios with respect to GFR are summarized in Table 1.
These results suggest that FA+CI is the only model that can be accepted by both groups of airlines in case
the grandfather rights were removed. It provides a slot allocation and a redistribution of costs which increase
the utility of the new airlines and do not statistically penalize the incumbent ones.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we propose a mechanism for solving the airport slot allocation problem. The mechanism considers
the interdependence of the slots at di®erent airports, and it maximizes the e±ciency of the system by allocating
slots to the airlines that value them the most. Through an experimental analysis we quantitatively evaluated
the cost imposed by the enforcement of grandfather rights, which constitute one of the main principles of the
current slot allocation mechanism.
Furthermore, we introduced a monetary compensation mechanism for augmenting fairness. We tested three
methods for implementing such a compensation, measuring their contribution in redistributing among airlines
the surplus deriving from the elimination of grandfather rights. In conclusion, through combining a free slot
allocation and a compensation mechanism, social utility increases, and even airlines that have grandfather rights
are often positively a®ected by their elimination.
Future works will be devoted to the analysis of what is commonly known as secondary slot market, i.e., slot
exchange among airlines after their primary allocation.
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